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1. Abstract 
 
This thesis is meant to give you an overview of the history of the Euro within the 
past decade, namely from 1997 to 2006. The main facts that will be dealt with are 
expectations, both positive versus negative and correct versus incorrect, before the 
start of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 and the de facto launch of 
the Euro currency in 2002 and in the early days of the Euro, as well as findings 
and analyses of the recent development and predictions for the future. A large part 
of this article is dedicated to a review of the literature from the time span in 
question. 
 
In the introduction I decided to provide a short overview of hard facts concerning 
the Euro, mainly based on data from the European central bank (ECB) and the 
international monetary fund (IMF).  
 
Following the introduction, the next topic will deal with articles and publications 
form both sides of the Atlantic Ocean in the time span from 1997 to 2006. In this 
section I tried to point out the differences between American and European 
economists on the topic of EMU.  
 
Chapter four deals with political influences on (or by) decision makers and the 
roles of the ECB, the Federal Reserve and the IMF. 
 
The next part is all about statistics. The key issue is the development of the 
exchange rate of the Euro compared to the US Dollar in the past decade. A few 
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other data such as several interest rates and data about trade force will also be 
introduced to lead into the empirical part: the attempt to find and explain the most 
important variables to explain the value of the European currency. 
 
To summarize things up, you will find a short coverage of all the relevant 
information in the conclusion (chapter six) and all the mentioned and referred to 
literature in the references. 
 
The appendix consists of my curriculum vitae and an abstract of the paper in 
English and in German.  
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2. Introduction 
 
In this introduction, you will find some background information about the history 
of the Euro and certain other things that are not fully covered in the main part of 
the thesis. I will also explain why I chose to write about this special issue, and the 
reasons for certain limitations in my research. 
 
The decision on the history of the Euro as the subject of my diploma thesis came 
mostly because of personal interest. In the final stages of my studies I developed, 
at this stage I may gratefully mention the positive influence of Professor Erich W. 
Streissler, a special interest in monetary subjects. Thus currencies, especially the 
domestic currency, namely the Euro, seemed to be an interesting subject to focus 
my research on. As there are an enormous number of articles that focus on the 
Euro, I thought it might be useful to summarize the most important findings and 
remarks of the past decade up and add some remarks and new findings to the 
history. 
 
I chose the time span from 1997 to 2006. The choice for 1997 as starting year 
came because the Stability and Growth Pact and the principles and fundamental 
elements of the new exchange rate mechanism were adopted by the Euro zone 
members in June of that year. Also in September 1997 the Finance Ministers of 
the European Union agreed on the date of May 1998 to announce the definitively 
fixed bilateral exchange rates for the participating currencies in the euro area. In 
May 1998 the 11 countries that then met the convergence criteria were presented 
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and later became the 11 day one Euro countries at the beginning of 1999. The end 
of the chosen time span is to be explained through the fact, that data from 2006 
are the most recent ones to seriously analyze and draw meaningful conclusions 
from. 
 
I concentrate mostly on the third and final stage in the creation process of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) which started on 1 January 1999. The 11 
countries that met the convergence criteria (“The degree of convergence is 
assessed on the basis of several criteria in the Maastricht Treaty, which require a 
country to have: a high degree of price stability, sound public finances, a stable 
exchange rate, low and stable long-term interest rates1”) and introduced the Euro 
as their “virtual currency” on January 1 1999 were: Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and 
Finland. Greece joined this group two years later on 1 January 2001 after fulfilling 
the criteria2, becoming the 12th country to introduce the Euro as its real and only 
currency on January 1 2002. The 13th and by now the latest country to join the 
European currency union was Slovenia on January 1 2007. 
 
The Euro zone countries have to choose to subordinate to the criteria of keeping 
budget deficit below three percent and government debt below 60 percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in order to be able to join the monetary union. 
                                                 
1Citation from: ECB Publications May 2006 "The European Central Bank, the Eurosystem, the 
European System of Central Banks" 
2 Greece reported falsified data and thereby suggested the impression that they fulfilled the criteria, 
which they actually did not. 
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Violations of these rules in longer terms result in sanctions against the concerning 
countries. 
 
The situation in Europe on the edge to introduce a common currency is, in some 
way, comparable to the situation of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy just before 
the introduction of the gold standard. Carl Menger (1892) then argued in favor of 
the adaptation of the gold standard in order to become competitive in an 
international sense. Even in the late 19th century, Menger described the handicap 
of the then silvervaluta3 as follows: There is neither sufficient inflow nor 
sufficient outflow of money in the outsider’s market. In order to get back to 
equilibrium, there has to be money flowing into the domestic market if there is not 
enough money circulating and the interest rates move up. Also there has to be 
money flowing out if market conditions move in the complementary direction. 
The domestic economy can hardly benefit from favorable business cycles in 
countries with other currencies because transaction costs eat up most of the gained 
profit from advantageous interest rates.4 These findings from the late 19th century 
express one of the probably most important arguments in favor of a common 
currency (standard). 
 
More than 100 years or two centuries later, the decision to join a monetary union 
carries of course benefits and costs for each member country. The most obvious 
                                                 
3 all other European countries except for Austria-Hungary and Russia had already turned to the 
gold standard at that time 
4 See Menger, C. “Beiträge zur Währungsfrage in Oesterreich-Ungarn” (1892) from: Carl Mengers 
Gesammelte Werke Band IV, 2. Auflage (1970) pp. 138-145 
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benefits are reduced transaction costs and highly stable (or at least predictable) 
prices, while the most remarkable cost is probably the loss of independent 
National Banks which results in giving up monetary policy to a higher authority 
and thereby losing an important stabilizing tool. Several studies show that trade 
levels of countries within a currency area is much larger than trade capacity of 
countries that have their own currencies. The same positive effect can be found in 
connection with business cycles. Within a currency union, business cycles become 
much more synchronized. Rose and Engel (2002) for example explain that 
business cycles seem to be more synchronized and correlated between members 
of a currency union, but they are not as highly correlated as they are between 
regions of a single country. 
 
Rose and van Wincoop (2001) see an enormous chance in the monetary union, 
taking the example of EMU. The authors predict a rise of inner European trade by 
more than 50 percent. The main argument in their article is that foreign currencies 
are a barrier to trade. Eliminating this barrier will in their opinion lead to 
considerable beneficial effects and it will outweigh the negative effects of giving 
up national monetary policy. Their results show, that the largest increase in 
welfare occurs if the countries in question have been trading amongst each other 
before they join the union. Rose and van Wincoop conclude with the outlook on 
further currency unions if the EMU and the numerous countries that introduced 
the US Dollar5 as their common trade currency are as profitable for common 
welfare as expected. 
                                                 
5 The phenomenon of foreign countries adapting the US Dollar as their trade currency is referred 
to as “Dollarization”.  
  Page 8 
Thoughts about the EURO – predictions, reflections and analysis within a decade 
 
After having heard of these arguments for a common currency, many might ask 
why we do not establish a global currency. Richard Cooper (1984) dealt with this 
idea which was picked up in an Article by Rogoff (2001). Rogoff starts by 
expressing the thought that the system of the US Dollar, the Yen and the Euro as 
the leading currencies is an arrangement that is close to being optimal. As the 
number of currencies is likely to decline over the next couple of years it seems 
obvious that leading currencies will be of increasing relevance. Still, independent 
monetary policy is an important tool which would have to be given up when 
joining a currency area. A more precise look on this matter can be found in 
chapter four of this paper.  
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3. Review of the Literature 
 
In the time span from 1997 to 2006 there are an enormous number of articles, 
remarks and reports to be found. In this paper I tried to focus mainly on those that 
were published in the leading collections of literature such as the American 
Economic Review (AER), the European Economic Review (EER), the Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, the Journal of Political Economy and a few others but only if the 
articles were of special interest to the subject. 
 
During the process of reading the literature I found that the American writers, 
especially in the years just before the launch of the then new European currency, 
tended to have, or at least express different expectations concerning the Euro than 
most of their European colleagues in terms of exchange rate stability, difficulties 
in adapting the new European currency and several other issues. The range of 
divergence runs from “slightly different opinions” to “completely different 
opinions”. 
 
Therefore I chose to separate some of the most important articles that will be 
analyzed into European ones on the one hand and American ones on the other. 
Also I tried to keep a certain structure within the summarized topics by sorting 
them according to contents and (wherever possible) according to time of 
publishing. There are of course lots of cross-section topics where American and 
European economists deal with the same issues and sometimes come up with 
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different suggestions or findings. I tried to link those by referring to related text 
passages whenever such an event occurs. 
 
The literature is of course no entirely either typically American or European. 
Papers and publications that do not do not fit into the former scheme are 
mentioned and referred to in the suitable passages of other chapters. Therefore 
this paper is heavy on already published literature but I think that this is a good 
way to get an overview of the vast amount of articles and comments that have 
been published over the past ten years. 
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3.1. The European view 
 
While studying the literature, I found that there are a whole lot of articles on the 
European view of European monetary union. EMU as such was seen only to be 
reasonable with a larger number of countries taking part right from the start. 
European Economists showed mainly a rather positive and excited view on EMU, 
especially in the years before the start of the Euro.  
 
In an article Thygesen (1997) deals mainly with the aspect of flexible integration,6 
where he mentions the importance of at least seven to eight countries being day 
one participants of EMU. He also supposes that a certain kind of asymmetry 
might be needed in order to make it more attractive for others to join either right 
at the start or in a later stage. 
 
Rüdiger Dornbusch (1997) wrote an article about the possibility of overweighting 
fiscal criteria in the EMU. Dornbusch found that debt is of course a risk for solid 
monetary policy and that the Maastricht Treaty with its limitation on debt and 
deficits is a proper tool to avoid inflation, but the danger of pushing limitations 
too far and too hard was definitely subject to several discussions at the time. 
Wyplosz (1997) even raises the question whether the tough criteria of the 
Maastricht Treaty will backfire on Europe and if Europe is an optimal currency 
                                                 
6 The term flexible integration is explained as to differentiate between core policy areas which are 
mandatory for all members and other areas where participation is voluntary. 
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area at all.7 He also refers to several other studies on topics like the labor 
movement issue that are dealt with later on in chapter 3.2.  
 
The Deutsche Mark-US Dollar market was the world’s largest one in terms of 
turnover; it was highly liquid and had low transaction costs.8 This issue will be 
picked up in chapter 4.1. of this paper where the topic is the European Central 
Bank and the leading role of Germany in European monetary policy since the 
implementation of EMU. 
 
Regional differences and the reaction to country- or region specific shocks 
(asymmetric shocks) without the tool of exchange rates are an often discussed 
matter in connection with pros and cons of EMU. This pattern is also discussed in 
further detail in chapter 3.2 of this paper.  
 
One of the earliest publications on this topic that I found within the examined time 
span is by Fatás (1997) and concentrates on the evolution of cross-boarder 
relationships. In his article, Fatás explains the danger of uncertain effects of 
asymmetric shocks like regional recessions and unemployment because of limited 
labor movement in the EU. He concludes that negative correlations across 
countries decrease over time while at the same time cross country correlations are 
                                                 
7 See Wyplosz, C. “EMU: Why and How It Might Happen”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 
11(4), Fall 1997, p. 3-22 
8 See Andersen, T. G.; Bollerslev, T. “Deutsche Mark-Dollar Volatility: Intraday Activity Patterns, 
Macroeconomic Announcements, and Longer Run Dependencies”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
53, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 219-265 
  Page 13 
Thoughts about the EURO – predictions, reflections and analysis within a decade 
constantly increasing.9 This leads to the result that members of the EU switch 
their economic view from seeing different countries to one seeing different 
regions within the Union. A common currency would most likely further support 
this movement. 
 
One of the few skeptical papers is by Thom and Walsh (2002). They use the 
experience from the introduction of the exchange rate between Ireland and the UK 
in 1979 to find evidence for or against common currencies. The authors found, 
that the exchange rate regime had no effect on trade between Ireland and the UK. 
They mention that this is consistent with findings on large and developed 
countries but is contradictory to findings that include heterogeneous country 
groups. The concluding remark indicates that the authors are doubtful about the 
effects of a currency union on countries that already trade freely amongst each 
other. 
                                                 
9 In his article, Fatás shows that the correlations of employment growth rates of the 12 EU 
countries from 1992 are all positive overall from 1966 to 1992. He uses employment growth to 
approximate business cycles and as a measure of economic activity. 
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3.2. The American view 
 
Most US-American articles of the time before 2002 are dealing with the possible 
situation of the post 2002 years, after the Euro was visibly introduced, and its 
effects especially on the US Dollar. In the earlier articles that I treat (those that 
were published from 1997 to 1999), the common belief was that the European 
Union’s member countries will have a hard time keeping the Euro at a level (in 
terms of the exchange rate) with the Dollar. 
 
A common statement from that time is one that I found in an article by Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1997) where they confess that a review of the theoretical 
literature of that time is likely to be summed up by the conclusion that most 
authors share the opinion that “[…]”Europe is not an optimal currency area” 
without providing much analysis of how this situation is changing or of the 
comparative prospects of different countries.”10 The “Optimal Currency Issue” is 
subject to several other articles that are dealt with later in this paper. 
 
A pretty obvious finding is mentioned in a publication by Frankel and Rose 
(1997) where they claim that countries with a history of close trade links tend to 
have correlated business cycles and therefore are more likely to satisfy the criteria 
for entering a currency union because of their higher economic integration. They 
                                                 
10 Citation from: Bayoumi and Eichengreen, “Ever closer to heaven? An optimum-currency-area 
index for European countries”, European Economic Review, Volume 41, Number 3, April 1997 , 
pp. 761-770 
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raise the question whether the two indices of trade integration and symmetric 
business cycles can be assessed independently. Their empirical study shows that 
increased trade integration and open boarders can either result in specialization 
and asynchronous business cycles or in highly correlated business cycles because 
of intra industry trade. 
 
There are, of course, more articles from that time that are about profits and costs 
of currency areas in general and the EMU in particular. Feldstein (1998) for 
example referred to the advantages of a common currency because of cost and 
risk reduction in trade and investments within EMU countries which would result 
in an increase of intra-EMU trade. As for the exchange rate, Feldstein pointed out 
that several officials in Europe wanted the ECB to weaken the EURO on purpose 
to strengthen European industries and to make domestic products more 
competitive. According to Feldstein, French officials thought that a lower value of 
the EURO compared to the Dollar would help to fight unemployment and help 
boosting domestic industries. 11 
 
In an article from Obstfeld (1998) the strategy for the start of the common 
European currency is analyzed from the pre-EMU view. In his work, he breaks 
down the scheme of switching from many national currencies to one common 
currency. It becomes clear, that the highly predictable and reliable preannounced 
currency conversion factors after the selection of EMU members in May 1998 
                                                 
11 See Feldstein, M. “The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: 
Political Sources of an Economic Liability”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 4 
(Autumn, 1997), pp. 23-42 
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only held strong because no one of the potential members left the EMU between 
May 1998 and the end of stage two in the creation of EMU which ended on 
December 31 1998. A reduction of the number of participants at that time may 
have had unpredictable effects on the start, the early years and the intra-European 
exchange rates of the EMU. On January 1 1999 the irrevocably fixed exchange 
rates became reality. 
 
Michael Mussa (1997) indicated the symbolic importance of a common currency 
as being one of the most important criteria in favor of the EMU alongside its 
economic benefits. He also talks about the stronger commitment to fixed 
exchange rates and also to membership of a group itself once countries are in a 
currency union and no longer in a currency area where every country has its own 
independent Central Bank. 
 
In a publication by Dominick Salvatore from the Department of Economics of 
Fordham University in New York (1997) he states that the currency area of the 
United States is much closer to being an optimal one, than the EMU, because of 
the much greater labor mobility and fiscal redistribution within the United States. 
An article by Krugman (1993) points out, that the lack of mobility within Europe 
results in regional specialization and that this situation will become even worse if 
asymmetric shocks occur.12 
 
                                                 
12 Krugman, Paul, "Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU" In Torres, Francisco and Francesco 
Giavazzi, eds., “The Transition to Economic and Monetary Union.” Cambridge University Press, 
1993, pp 241-269 
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The mobility topic is also mentioned in other articles, especially the fact, that 
greater mobility makes it easier for an economy to lower the need for exchange 
rate adjustment because of the possibility to cope with asymmetric shocks through 
migration and movement of manpower and other sources of labor.13 Some articles 
even point out the lack of mobility not only between countries in Europe, but also 
between regions of the same country.14 The findings of course differ.15  
                                                 
13 Blanchard, O.; Katz, L. et al. “Regional Evolutions”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
Vol. 1992, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1-75 
14 Eichengreen, B. 'European Monetary Unification', Journal of Economic Literature, 31, 
September 1993 pp. 1321-1357 
15 See chapter 3.1 of this paper 
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4. Political Issues 
 
With a far-ranging and highly sensitive major change in an economic area as the 
common currency area in the EU, there is the need to always take economic as 
well as political aspects into consideration. This chapter deals with the whole 
range from federal and regional policies over politically induced corporate feeling 
to global policy and its (possible) effects on world trade. The broader topics like 
Central Banks or enlargement of the Union are dealt with in separate subchapters. 
 
A big issue is the birth of a new, big trade area with a common currency. Several 
authors see an extremely good possibility to make global negotiations in world 
trade easier and to reduce volatility in exchange rates by reducing the G-7 
countries (the seven largest industrialized nations of the world: United States, 
Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Canada) by combining Germany, 
France, Great Britain (with its own currency) and Italy into one (EU).16 There 
were of course also rather skeptical thoughts on this issue as from Feldstein 
(1998) who expressed the opinion that the creation of the ECB, which would be in 
charge of the money supply for the whole EMU and control the short-time interest 
rates, would rather result in a higher inflation rate than the system of National 
Central Banks. 
 
                                                 
16 See: Kenen, P.; “Sorting out some EMU issues”, Reprints in international Finance, Princeton 
University No. 29, December 1996 and Wyplosz, C. “EMU: Why and How It Might Happen”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4), Fall 1997, p. 3-22 
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The political aspect of the introduction of EMU is also the subject in articles in 
the pre-EMU era. In one of the most notable ones Martin Feldstein (1998) 
expresses his opinion that the decision for or against EMU does not depend as 
much on economic issues as it does on political ones. He thinks, that the loss of 
power of all the individual countries in favor of an ECB can only be realized if the 
decision makers are convinced that the political advantages of a monetary union 
outweigh the disadvantages to the individual countries and the positive effect on 
the common European political development outweighs the advantage of giving 
more power to a NCB, but only for a single and of course smaller country and its 
currency.17 
 
Another symbolic issue is the importance of a single currency as an icon for 
sovereign countries in general and to the EU in particular. The introduction of the 
Euro could help building a corporate feeling among the people living in the EU 
member countries as referred to by Feldstein (1998). The same issue is also 
mentioned in an article by Michael Mussa (1997) where he points out that the 
EMU is a symbolic act with big influence on the strengthening of political 
dimensions within the European Union. It was also of particular political 
importance for the EMU to start on time18, because skeptics were always taking 
the chance of delays or even failure of the EMU into account. The fact that the 
southern countries of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece were struggling to fulfill 
                                                 
17See Feldstein, M. “The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: 
Political Sources of an Economic Liability”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 4 
(Autumn, 1997), pp. 23-42 
18 The scheduled and actual starting date was January 1, 1999. 
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the criteria to be part of the EMU straight from the start had almost forced either a 
delay or the disqualification of these countries. In 1997 R. Mundell pointed out 
the crucial danger of facing a first- and a second class status within the EU. 
Therefore it was inevitable for the former mentioned countries to fulfill the 
criteria and join the Euro zone as only this ensured that the Euro really became the 
European currency and not only the currency of the richer European countries. In 
his paper, he mentions the successful policy of Italy, Spain and Portugal which 
made their interest rates approximate the German level. He suggests that this 
might be appropriate for Greece too, as it would cut interest payments on debt 
enormously. Mundell concludes that it might be possible for all EU countries to 
join the monetary union by 1999. 
 
One of the most apparent advantages of a common currency is the absolute price 
transparency. Alesina et al. (2005) highlighted the opportunity to facilitate price 
stability in a currency area from which all participants would profit. In their 
article, the authors mention the problematic situation of conflict of interests that 
arises from the difference of national and European preferences. The ongoing 
debate about the European constitution is of little help in this matter. The authors 
mention in their own words that “[…] the EU is struggling with finding the 
correct balance between coordination and centralization of policies at the EU 
level and autonomy of member countries.”19 
 
                                                 
19 Citation from: Alesina, A., Angeloni, I. and Etro, F. "International Unions" The American 
Economic Review Vol. 95 No. 3 (June 2005) pp. 602-615 
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Transparency of prices is also subject to an article I found by Crucini et al. (2005). 
The Law-of-One-Price (LOP) that they refer to indicates that “[…] identical 
goods in different countries should have identical prices, once the prices are 
expressed in common currency units.”20 As the danger that arises from a lack in 
adjustment of domestic prices to changes in exchange rates is eliminated by the 
common currency, this finding seems pretty obvious. Their empirical findings 
show that in the European Union, most of the means of price differences of 
comparable goods are indeed close to zero.  
 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) made an interesting finding in their article 
about currency areas. They constructed an Optimal Currency Area (OCA) Index 
and, based on that, divided the EMU candidate countries into three groups: the 
highly ready ones, the ones with a tendency to converge and countries where little 
or even no convergence is measurable. The most notable exception is France. The 
data show, that France does neither have high bilateral exchange rate stability 
with Germany, nor an easy transition to monetary union, but still the will to join 
the EMU was very strong. This, according to the authors, underlines the 
importance of not only economic issues, but also political ones in the case of 
France joining the EMU.21 In my opinion, it is also a good example of the weight 
of political influence in decision making, especially in monetary policy. 
                                                 
20 Citation from: Crucini, M., Telmer, C. and Zachariadis, M. "Understanding European Real 
Exchange Rates", The American Economic Review Vol. 95 (3) (June 2005) pp. 724-738 
21 See Bayoumi and Eichengreen, “Ever closer to heaven? An optimum-currency-area index for 
European countries”, European Economic Review, Volume 41, Number 3, April 1997 , pp. 761-
770 
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Federal policies in the EU, especially compared to US policies were also subject 
to papers as one from Forni and Reichlin (2001) where they propose an estimation 
method which exploits output fluctuations and compares European regions with 
US counties. Their empirical results show, that Europe is as integrated as the US, 
while the highest integration in Europe can be found within regions that do not 
necessarily belong to only one country.22 They play down their findings in the 
conclusion by stating that trade flows and diversification of local economies are 
not likely to change in the short run. 
 
Blanchard (2004) describes the mood in Europe after the troubled years at the 
beginning of the new century as “gloomy”23. He refers to the broadly expressed 
opinion that the model of the European economy is no longer up to date, as it 
failed to keep up with globalism. In the author’s opinion, the main difference 
between Europe and the US is that the increased productivity of the work force 
has resulted to an increase in leisure time in Europe while in the US it resulted in 
an increase of income. These different trends manifest the fact that the ratio of 
GDP per capita in the EU 15 compared to the US practically has not changed 
from 1970 to 2000, while the GDP per hour worked showed a massive catch up of 
the EU 15 countries within the same time period, climbing from about 65% of the 
US value up to about 91% according to the data in Blanchard’s article. The author 
                                                 
22 The authors find that the regional component in Europe is much more important than the 
national one. 
23 Citation from Blanchard, O. “The Economic Future of Europe” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 4 (autumn, 2004), pp. 3-26 
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furthermore criticizes the inefficient regulation within Europe but he adds a 
positive aspect to the article by stating that there is a reform process going on. 
 
Carré and Collard (2003) find the households in an economy can benefit from the 
implementation of a monetary union when there is a “[…] positive asymmetric 
permanent shock to either technology or government expenditures occurring in 
one country […]”.24  
 
One of the problems that authors thought could come with EMU might be the 
inevitable cutbacks in social welfare programs across Europe. The cutback would 
have come anyway as they are absolutely necessary but, especially according to 
American Economists like Mussa (1997), the population might hold EMU 
responsible for the loss of many of these social benefits. Because of the 
commonly known Maastricht Criteria, the EMU might get politically blamed for 
decreasing several welfare programs in order to fulfill the criteria for the stability 
pact. 
                                                 
24 Citation from: Carré, M. and Collard, F. “Monetary union: A welfare based approach” European 
Economic Review 47 (2003) pp. 521 – 552 
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4.1. The European Central Bank 
 
The duties and responsibilities of the ECB consist of making monetary policy for 
the EMU, deal with the exchange rate policy of the Euro and take care of 
domestic fiscal issues. 
 
“The Maastricht Treaty only came about because the lifting of capital controls 
had reduced the alternate options to just two unpalatable extremes: either allow 
exchange rates to float freely or accept the complete domination of Germany’s 
Bundesbank over Europe’s monetary policy.”25 
 
This statement by Wyplosz (1997) explains the outcome of the political pressure 
that Germany implemented on the European Union in return for the sacrifice of 
one of its most powerful institutions – the German Bundesbank in favor of a 
European Central Bank. The German Bundesbank had made quite a reputation for 
fighting inflation and keeping the domestic currency, the D-Mark, strong and 
therefore it came as no big surprise, that the newly founded ECB is practically a 
successor of the German Bundesbank with its Headquarters in Frankfurt/Main in 
Germany. The ECB profits from existing infrastructures of the former National 
Central Banks (NCB). The Maastricht Treaty defined 1 July 1998 as the deadline 
for the establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
 
                                                 
25 Citation from Wyplosz, C. “EMU: Why and How It Might Happen”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 11(4), Fall 1997, p. 3-22 
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Since the European Monetary Institute (EMI) had been established in 1994, it had 
focused on preparatory work for establishing a European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) which now consists of the ECB and the NCBs of all member countries of 
the EU. The most important issue that the EMI dealt with was that the ECB would 
conduct the single monetary policy with its primary objective being the 
maintenance of price stability. 
 
Dr. W. F. Duisenberg, President of the European Monetary Institute explained the 
four main characteristics of the ESCB's operational framework in a speech at the 
International Banking Seminar in Hong Kong on 22 September 1997 like this: 
 
“First, the ESCB will operate in the money market mainly through standard 
market-oriented operations, such as open market operations. Two standing 
facilities and the possibility of imposing reserve requirements have also been 
prepared. Administrative instruments that may create distortions or subsidies for 
some categories of operators have been discarded.  
 
Second, the monetary policy operations of the ESCB will largely be executed in a 
decentralized manner by the NCBs. It has been agreed that the ECB will be 
entitled to conduct fine-tuning operations, under exceptional circumstances, and 
occasional foreign exchange intervention.  
 
Third, in defining eligible assets for monetary policy operations, existing 
differences in Member States' financial structures, which are of particular 
importance for national financial markets and banking systems, have been taken 
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into account in the preparatory work with a view to ensuring some continuity for 
market participants in the different countries.  
 
Finally, the monetary policy framework has been designed with a view to 
ensuring that homogeneous conditions are applied to all counterparties, 
irrespective of their location in the euro area. For instance, although regular 
tenders for central bank money will be implemented in a decentralized manner, 
they will be decided and organized centrally by the ECB, thereby ensuring equal 
treatment for counterparties.” 26 
 
The monetary policy of the ECB’s antecessor, the Deutsche Bundesbank was 
subject to a close investigation by Ben Bernanke and Ilian Mihov (1997). It was 
remarked that the Bundesbank responded more to inflation and much less to 
changes in money growth forecasted. In support it was shown that the 
Bundesbank used to specify money growth targets as ranges and inflation target as 
more accurate points. The main focus of the Bundesbank from 1985 on was 
always to reach the inflation target of two percent which it considered to be equal 
to price stability. 
 
The idea of Germany as being a suitable “leader” of the ECB is supported by 
Mussa (1997). He points out that the policy of following a dominant leader 
(Germany) has worked out fine throughout the 1990’s for smaller countries, but 
                                                 
26 Citatation from: Duisenberg, Dr. W. F. “The European Monetary Institute and progress towards 
monetary union” Speech  at the International Banking Seminar in Hong Kong on 22 September 
1997 
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he sees problems with such linkages between countries of similar economic size 
(e.g. Germany and France). With the goal of becoming one of the founding 
members in EMU, most countries in the European Union had brought down their 
inflation rates following the German example to the “German standard” of around 
two percent. The fact that smaller countries like Austria and the Netherlands had 
their currencies successfully fixed to the Deutsche Mark before had already been 
proof for the benefit of a fixed parity.  
 
The big influence of Germany is an often discussed matter in the literature. Nautz 
and Offermanns (2006) for example tried to examine whether virtual pre-EMU 
data or German data are a better base for the evaluation of Euro/Dollar exchange 
rate behavior. The dominance of Germany in the time before EMU makes this 
decision a very hard one. The choice for the synthetic data would imply that the 
determination of the European exchange rate remains unchanged. The choice for 
the German data would imply that the Euro more or less took over the place of the 
German Mark. The authors remark, that the assumption that the Euro simply 
follows the Mark is a far too simple view. “Above and beyond that, out-of-sample 
predictions show that specifications based on synthetic European data 
significantly outperform German models over the EMU period.”27 
 
The history of the ECB is commonly seen as a success story. Alesina and Perotti 
(2004) for example grant the EU undisputed success with their Central Bank and 
                                                 
27 Citation from: Nautz, D., Offermanns, C. “Does the Euro follow the German Mark? Evidence 
from the Monetary Model of the Exchange Rate” European Economic Review 50(5) (June 2006) 
pp. 1279-1295 
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the monetary policy thanks to avoidance of institutional complexity in the process 
of the foundation of this independent institution. Alesina and Perotti further 
mention the importance of the one main objective policy which puts price stability 
in the center of attention.  
 
The efficiency of the ECB relies mostly on the common will of the member 
countries. The EMU members had already proven their intention to trust the ECB 
as their decision maker in terms of monetary policy by giving up their sovereign 
National Central Banks in favor of a superior institution. Frankel and Rose (1998) 
argue that because the business cycles of the countries that join the EMU will 
become more synchronized, the disadvantage of giving up independent national 
monetary policy will be lowered significantly. 
 
On the subject of EMU and ECB models, I recommend Dixit (2001). In his paper 
he constructed various models of EMU and ECB with their member countries 
having different objectives and not acting in concert. In his opinion, the most 
encouraging finding is that even continued tracing of national goals by member 
countries does not necessarily lead to failure in pursuing the interest of the EMU 
and the ECB. He concludes with the statement that if every country votes in its 
own national interest and inflation is moderate28, the situation leads to 
equilibrium.  
 
                                                 
28 According to Dixit (2001), because of the low variance of the median of country specific 
shocks, the volatility of inflation within EMU is reduced. 
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An interesting aspect that comes along with the fusion of the sovereign National 
Banks in the Euro zone is the danger of relying too much on the decision makers 
of the ECB. Ricci and Isard (2002) express a warning note as EMU countries 
might not put as much effort into the stabilization of exchange rates as they did in 
the pre-EMU era. Therefore they see the argument that the Euro will be a more 
stable currency than its predecessors as possible but not certain. 
 
 
4.1.1. Monetary policy of the ECB 
 
The absolute power of conducting monetary policy for the EMU and the 
problematic situation at the beginning of the Euro era has been treated in several 
articles. In the years before the start of the new European currency, the forecasts 
of European economic performance were in the center of attention. One of the 
articles that deal with this issue is one by Marcellino et al. (2003). They 
investigated data from the EMU countries over a 15 year time span from 1982 to 
1997. Their most significant finding shows that “[…] forecasts constructed by 
aggregating the country-specific models are more accurate than forecasts 
constructed using the aggregate data.”29 
 
                                                 
29 Citation from: Marcellino M.; Stock J.H.; Watson M.W. “Macroeconomic forecasting in the 
Euro area: Country specific versus area-wide information” European Economic Review, Volume 
47 (1), (February 2003) pp. 1-18 
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The ECB has always been superficially seen as a European counterpart to the US 
Federal Reserve.30 The ECB however always refers to its primary objective as 
being the maintenance of price stability and the intention to keep inflation rates at 
the level of below two percent over the medium term. Rudebusch and Svensson 
(2002) speak of a […] “weak type of monetary targeting and an implicit form of 
inflation targeting”31 when talking about the monetary strategy of the ECB. In 
their article, they try to draw conclusions from US data in order to project 
European data by comparing the relative performance of the former mentioned 
monetary targeting and inflation targeting. The authors confess, that the difficult 
issue about empirical analysis at that time was, in general, the lack of utilizable 
data from the euro-area. Still, the relevance of US data as some sort of guideline is 
indisputable as the two areas are roughly comparable in terms of economic size 
and importance and, of course, monetary union. The results show, that monetary 
targeting seems to be quite inefficient in both the American and the European 
model. Inflation targeting leads to comparable results while keeping inflation 
lower. Also the effect of output gap variability is higher in the money targeting 
model. 
 
The impact of asymmetries on the effectiveness of monetary policy in the Euro 
area is the key issue in an article by Aksoy et al. (2002). The political 
                                                 
30 See “http://www.ecb.int/mopo/html/index.en.html” for a detailed overview of ECB monetary 
policy and “http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm” for a detailed overview of 
Federal Reserve monetary policy. 
31 Citation from: Rudebusch, G. and Svensson, L. "Eurosystem Monetary Targeting: Lessons from 
U.S. Data" European Economic Review 46 (2002) pp. 417-442 
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independence of the ECB is mentioned as well as the fact that all other objectives 
that belong to the duties of the ECB may not keep the ECB from achieving its 
main objective witch is price stability. As mentioned in chapter 4.1., the interest 
conflict of national representatives in the process of decision making is also 
mentioned. The findings show that the differences from the commonly decided 
interest rate32 to the ones that are desired nationally can lead to considerable 
frustration, especially in smaller countries. Another conflict may arise if one 
country desires to stabilize its output. In that case, the interest rate is favored to 
react to asymmetric shocks thus leading to a gap between the nationally desired 
interest rate and the one decided by the ECB. The authors state that welfare across 
the union is more likely to increase under a policy that acts on behalf of the EMU 
than under a policy that is driven by several national interests. I agree with that 
finding, as a situation in which every member country’s representative is only 
pursuing national interests would most probably lead to stagnation. 
 
Coenen and Wieland (2005) compare the three largest economies in the EMU, 
Germany, France and Italy, and find that both France and Italy had to run through 
a convergence process, while Germany had already achieved stable inflation 
before the EMU. The goal is to construct a model of three countries within the 
Euro area to show the performances of alternative monetary strategies. They 
compare the nominal wage contracting model to several versions of the relative 
wage contracting model. Their findings show that the relative wage contracting 
                                                 
32 The commonly decided interest rate refers to the interest rate fixed by the ECB which represents 
the median voter’s decision. 
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model fits countries that come from a high inflation regime, like France and Italy 
better, while the nominal wage contracting model fits German data better. 
 
Many economists held the ECB responsible for the rather poor performance of the 
Euro in its early years because of the ECB’s solid persuasion of all the EMU 
member countries and their respective National Banks to stick strictly to the 
Maastricht criteria and adopt the interest rates to the low standard of Germany at 
that time. Further remarks on that topic are to be dealt with in chapter 5.1. of this 
article. 
 
Voices against the current ECB strategy recently became louder, as some 
economists questioned the strategy of differing between economic and monetary 
dimensions. Former leading economist of the ECB, Othmar Issing, just recently 
spoke out against intended changes of the ECB’s strategy. Issing stated in a guest 
article in the Financial Times Germany (2006) that as long as a solid solution for 
unifying the two pillars of the ECB has not been worked out, there is no need to 
change the current situation which he describes as a success story.  
 
Clarida et al. (1999) published a very interesting article where they treat the 
importance of monetary policy as such and the newly found interest on the 
matters of monetary policy at the end of the old century. This paper provides in 
depth information for better understanding of the backgrounds and developments 
in monetary policy. 
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4.1.2. ECB and the Fed 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4.1.1., in the literature the ECB is often compared to the 
US Federal reserve. In its structure, there are also several similarities. Both 
institutions had for example 12 members in the examined time span. The Fed 
consists of 12 Federal Reserve Banks that represent different regions of the US. 
The 12 are: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Kansas City, 
Minneapolis, New York, Philadelphia, Richmond, San Francisco, and St. Louis. 
The ECB consisted of the 12 National Central Banks of the starting Euro member 
countries which are mentioned in the introduction.33 
 
For a close insight of Fed policy from the late 1980’s on, I highly recommend the 
paper of Alan Greenspan (2004), where he talks about the key developments of 
monetary policy in the US. Amongst other facts, Greenspan explains the Fed’s 
intentions in raising the funds rate (refinancing interest rate) to 6.5 % in May 2000 
to keep the inflation rate down and he speaks about the rate falling (also 
connected to the terrorist actions in September 2001) to 1 % in mid-2003 as 
mirroring the goal of price stability that has been worked on for over two 
decades.34 Greenspan also mentions the phenomenon of the very mild recession in 
the US in the early years of the new century “[…] despite the stock market 
plunge, terrorist attacks, corporate scandals, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
                                                 
33 With Slovenia joining the Euro Area on January 1 2007, there are now 13 NCB members in the 
ECB. 
34 See Figure 1 
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[…].”35 He refers to other opinions that see the business decline from May 2001 
to 2003 only as a part of long term imbalances.  
 
The Fed’s policy is also investigated in relation to the new economy. Ball and 
Tchaidze (2002) dedicated an article to that subject. The former chairman of the 
Fed, Alan Greenspan is described as one of the first to realize the growth in 
productivity in the 1990s but still he kept the interest rates at very low levels 
against all odds. The positive situation that the US markedly benefited from low 
inflation and unemployment as well as stable growth especially in the second half 
of the 1990s, which stands for the area of the “new economy”36, was of course 
very helpful for the successful era in the US at that time. The common opinion at 
that time was that Greenspan spotted the new economy before others did. The 
authors conclude that Greenspan’s achievements were remarkable, but not 
everything stands and falls with one man, as they have rather positive 
expectations for the new century. 
 
When observing data from both the European and the US American market, the 
most obvious differences are the rapid and intense reactions to economic events 
by adapting interest rates by the Fed. The ECB tends to take things easier and rely 
more on consistency when readjusting the European interest rates. The often 
                                                 
35 Citation from: Greenspan, A. “Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy” The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 2 (May, 2004) pp. 33-40 
36 Citation from: Ball, L. and Tchaidze, R., "The Fed and the New Economy" The American 
Economic Review Vol. 92 No. 2 (May 2002) pp. 108-114 
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described situation sees the Fed as the leader and the ECB as the follower because 
the US trends are usually adopted in Europe afterwards. 
 
When focusing on short term interest rates, one has to wonder how effective 
monetary policies can be made by the Central Banks when facing short term 
interest rates at very low levels. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) gave an overview 
of monetary policies with short term interest being close to zero or even zero all 
together. They state that monetary policy commitments can influence the 
economy for example by ensuring that the short term interest rates will be kept 
lower in the future than the current expectations indicate. The central banks seem 
to even value the importance of influencing market expectations by giving out 
information about their future policies very early. The danger with short term 
interest being close to zero is of course that investors will be looking for 
alternatives. This would affect liquidity in some markets as more people would 
invest in more profitable long term funds. The danger arising from public belief is 
that people might interpret low overnight interest rates as a sign of ineffectiveness 
of monetary policy and incompetence of the central bank. They repeat on that 
occasion that central banks also have other means of stimulating monetary policy 
than lowering short term interest. 
 
In contrast to the short time interest rates, I will now focus on longer term, 
refinancing interest rates from both the ECB and the Fed. In Figure 1, you can see 
the movements from the beginning of the Euro area (January 1999) until 
December 2006. 
  Page 36 
Thoughts about the EURO – predictions, reflections and analysis within a decade 
Figure 1: Refinancing interest Rates of the ECB and the Fed from 
January 1999 to December 2006. 
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In the period since the introduction of the Euro the Fed has been more active in 
adjusting its interest rates than the ECB. In Figure 1, I chose to compare the 
changes in the refinancing interest rates in both the US and the EU from 1999 to 
2006. While the interest rates in the US range from 1 percent to 6.5 percent in the 
observed eight year period, the interest rate in the Euro zone ranges only from 3 
percent to 5.75 percent in the same period. The data prove the commonly accepted 
situation of the Fed reacting faster and more radically to outside influences while 
the ECB follows the trend of the fed but with a considerable time lag and a much 
smoother appreciation or depreciation of the interest rate. 
 
                                                 
37 Data source: eurostat; see eurostat Homepage for full data set (http:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat). 
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A closer look at Figure 1 shows that ECB interest rates tend to follow the 
direction that is predetermined by the Fed. This development in time leads to the 
assumption that the ECB interest rate changes are related to the ones given by the 
leader, the Fed. 
 
Monetary policy shocks and their power to measure unexpected developments in 
monetary policy are subject to a paper by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002). The 
authors find that the Fed seems to react on long term interest rates, as short term 
interest rates seem to be of little help in forecasting target changes. Due to this, 
the event of interest-forecasts of target changes may be influenced not only by 
interest rate target changes but also by the Fed’s reaction to interest rates. They 
add another remark which states that the Fed always claims only to react to 
economic events, and never confess that they might influence certain events with 
their actions. 
 
 
4.2. EU enlargement 
 
This subchapter is dedicated to reviews of publications on enlargement, especially 
eastern enlargement, of the EU. 
 
The question of further enlargement of the EU area has always been an issue, also 
before the European currency was “born”. Many writers have expressed their 
concern about more and more countries joining the EU and in succession joining 
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EMU. The accession criteria, also called Copenhagen criteria, are stated by the 
European Council as follows: 
 
“Membership criteria require that the candidate country must have achieved 
 
• stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities;  
• the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;  
• the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to 
the aims of political, economic & monetary union.”38 
 
Alesina et al. (2005) found that in order to accept new candidate countries, the 
existing members must benefit from the effects that result from the entry of new 
members into existing unions. They describe it as “[…] a trade-off between the 
size and the scope of the union.”39 In the context of enlargement, the problematic 
question is whether to specifically arrange the competences of the EU in the new 
constitution or to leave many areas as vaguely defined as they are now. The 
advantages and disadvantages of rigid versus flexible Unions are also discussed in 
the article mentioned. 
 
                                                 
38 Citation from: European Council, June 1993 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm) 
39 Citation from: Alesina, A., Angeloni, I. and Etro, F. "International Unions" The American 
Economic Review Vol. 95 No. 3 (June 2005) pp. 602-615 
  Page 39 
Thoughts about the EURO – predictions, reflections and analysis within a decade 
Since the introduction of EMU, the EU has accepted twelve countries as new 
members: In 2004, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia and in 2007 Romania and 
Bulgaria. Among all of these only Slovenia has already switched from its former 
currency, the Tolar, to the Euro40 with Cyprus and Malta being scheduled to 
follow in 2008.  
 
In the literature there are different opinions on enlargement. Daviddi and Ilzkovitz 
(1997) say that the integration into the Euro area should not be the number one 
target of the countries that were then associated to be candidates of an 
enlargement, but still they should make efforts to establish sound economic 
policies and see a membership in the Euro area as a long term goal. 
 
                                                 
40 On January 1 2007, Slovenia became the thirteenth member of the Euro area. 
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5. The Euro/Dollar relationship 
 
“Thus, whatever standard explanation of the exchange rate we turn to, it is at best 
true for a small part of the period in question, and that only if we close an eye.”41 
 
Exchange rates are always a highly sensitive subject to work on. Especially the 
work on floating exchange rates is seen to be hard in terms to get meaningful 
conclusions from. The research on linkages between macroeconomic basics like 
interest rates, productivity and money supply and the floating exchange rates are 
recently getting rather one sided, as the probability of them being close to random 
walks is mentioned more often in up to date publications. The traditional forecasts 
of exchange rates based on the most popular indicators, purchase power parity 
(PPP) and uncovered interest parity (UIP), and their relative low reliability are the 
main reason for the pessimistic comments on exchange rate predictions. This 
aspect is treated in detail in Streissler (2007) where he finds that both the PPP 
theory and the UIP theory turned out to deliver more wrong predictions than right 
ones in the forecast of US Dollar movement from the first quarter of 2002 to the 
fourth quarter of 2005. In the case of the US compared to the EU, both PPP and 
the interest rate showed very little differences over the past years which would 
implicate a negligible change in the exchange rates. As time has shown there was 
a rather larger movement in the exchange rate which shows that these theories are 
not exactly applicable in this case. 
                                                 
41 Citation from Streissler, E. W. “Towards an Empirically Founded Theory of Exchange Rates” 
(2007) 
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Charles Engel and Kenneth D. West published a theory in 2005 where they state 
that “[…] floating exchange rates between countries with roughly similar 
inflation rates are in fact well approximated as random walks. Fundamental 
variables do not help predict future changes in exchange rates.”42 This statement 
is of course meant in a general way, as they later refer to an article by Cheung, 
Chinn and Pascual (2002) which concludes that a certain model may perform well 
for one exchange rate but not for another. Engel and West further state that the 
fundamentals of macroeconomics43 might not be important figures to explain 
exchange rates, but exchange rates could potentially be helpful to predict future 
developments of these fundamentals. The authors continue to assume that there 
might be some not yet discovered and examined variables that control exchange 
rates. They admit however that in the late 1990’s the exchange rates within 
Europe became more predictable, which was mostly due to known arrangements 
of European countries to support exchange rate stabilization in order to prepare 
for the currency union. Perhaps the most significant conclusion that Engel and 
West are drawing is explained in the following citation: “We do not find much 
evidence that the exchange rate is explained only by the “observable” 
fundamentals.”44 
                                                 
42 Citation from: Engel, C. and West, K. “Exchange Rates and Fundamentals” Journal of Political 
Economy Vol. 113 (2005), pp. 485–517 
43 Engel and West refer to the standard set of fundamentals as money, income, prices, and interest 
rates 
44 Citation from: Engel, C. and West, K. “Exchange Rates and Fundamentals” Journal of Political 
Economy Vol. 113 (2005), pp. 485–517 
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The random walk theory of exchange rates by Meese and Rogoff (1983) has never 
been definitely proven wrong by empirical studies up to now. In fact, the literature 
seems to rather support the theory of (up to certain standards) non predictable 
exchange rates.45 
 
Another aspect to take into consideration is the fact that capital movement 
amongst (highly) developed countries is practically free nowadays which results 
in interest rate equality and an acclimatization of prices in a global context. These 
adjustments are obvious because otherwise investors would be constantly moving 
their capital to wherever it is most profitable for them. 
 
 
5.1. Euro/Dollar exchange rate development empirically 
 
“Of all the asset prices in an economy, one of the most important–certainly the 
most important if the economy is very open-is its currency’s exchange rate against 
foreign currencies.”46 
 
                                                 
45 See for example Fernando Alvarez, Andrew Atkeson, and Patrick J. Kehoe “If Exchange Rates 
Are Random Walks, Then Almost Everything We Say About Monetary Policy Is Wrong” (2007) 
AEA Papers and Proceedings (May 2007) pp. 339-345 
46 Citation from: Obstfeld, M. “Inflation-Targeting, Exchange-Rate Pass-through, and Volatility” 
The American Economic Review Vol. 92 No. 2 (May, 2002) pp. 102-107 
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This quotation from Obstfeld (2002) shows the high importance of exchange rate 
movements in a more and more globalized world. Obstfeld refers to the common 
view that inflation targeting in the domestic market is the most essential tool to 
keep the exchange rate at reasonable levels. In the conclusion, he mentions that 
exchange rate movements do not necessarily bring coordination problems among 
sovereign countries, but they will probably result in income redistributions within 
countries. 
 
I found an article that specializes on the exchange rate variability of the EMU and 
its effects on external countries. In the article by Ricci and Isard (2002), they find 
that the optimization of monetary policies does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that the EMU goes hand in hand with greater exchange rate variability. 
In a situation where countries are specializing because of comparative advantages, 
the authors investigate variability for several countries. When looking at small, 
specialized countries within the Euro area, a shock in the segment that they are 
specialized in results in higher variability under EMU than in the pre-EMU era. 
The opposite is true for large countries. 
 
In the time span from January 1997 to December 2006 I laid special interest on 
the average exchange rates of the Euro and the US Dollar based on monthly 
averages. Based on the Data from the ECB, the Euro had a “decade-high” 
exchange rate of 1.3408 Dollars per Euro in December 2004 and a “decade low” 
of 0.8532 Dollars per Euro in June 2001.47  
 
                                                 
47 See ecb.com for full data set 
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The ongoing trend of the Euro appreciation and the Dollar devaluation is subject 
to an article by Atkins and Schieritz (2006). In their article they refer to ECB and 
Fed data according to which the total value48 of Euro cash overtook the total value 
of US Dollar cash for the first time in history in October 2006. The authors see 
this development as an indication of the Euro outrunning the Dollar in 
international competition49.  
 
In international terms, investments in Euro currency also became particularly 
popular. Several sovereign governments have hinted that they are planning to 
rearrange their foreign currency assets and switch (at least partly) from Dollars to 
Euros. The rising demand for Euros goes hand in hand with the appreciation of 
the currency which is feared to lead to heavy losses in export business.  
 
To illustrate the data graphically, I used the monthly averages of the exchange 
rates which I found on the homepage of eurostat and worked out the following 
figures: 
                                                 
48 Based on the effective exchange rate there were Euro bills worth approx. 592 billion Euro and 
Dollar bills worth approx. 579 billion Euros in circulation. 
49 Outside the Euro and Dollar Zone 
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Figure 2: The price of one Euro in US Dollars from January 1997 
to December 2006. 
 
The price of 1 Euro in US Dollars from January 1997 to December 
2006
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
19
97
m
01
19
97
m
06
19
97
m
11
19
98
m
04
19
98
m
09
19
99
m
02
19
99
m
07
19
99
m
12
20
00
m
05
20
00
m
10
20
01
m
03
20
01
m
08
20
02
m
01
20
02
m
06
20
02
m
11
20
03
m
04
20
03
m
09
20
04
m
02
20
04
m
07
20
04
m
12
20
05
m
05
20
05
m
10
20
06
m
03
20
06
m
08
50 
Figure 2 shows the development of the Euro/Dollar exchange rate over the past 
decade.  
 
The starting rate in January 1997 was 1.21621 Dollar per Euro and stayed pretty 
constant in the last two pre EMU years with a rate of 1.17212 in December 1998. 
One can see a more or less constant decline of the Euro in the years from 1999 to 
2001. The introduction of the Euro as a visible and cash currency in 2002 marks a 
turning point in the Euro/Dollar relationship. One Euro was worth 0.8833 US 
Dollars in January 2002 and its rate climbed up to the worth of 1.3213 US Dollars 
in December 2006. One can see the troubled years between 1999 and 2002 
mentioned in the former chapters. If you look at the change of the exchange rate 
                                                 
50Data source: eurostat; see eurostat Homepage for full data set (http:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat). For 
further information on data before 1999, see comments to table 2. 
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value, ECB data show that the Euro has appreciated by more than 25 percent from 
January 4, 1999 to November 22, 2007. The change since the introduction of Euro 
cash in 2002 shows a far more dramatic number, namely an appreciation of almost 
64 percent from January 3, 2002 to November 22, 2007. 
 
Most recent data show of course the ongoing boom of the Euro/Dollar exchange 
rate with an up to date (based on monthly average data) high of 1.4227 Dollars per 
Euro in October 2007. The November figures show a continued development as 
the Euro reached a new all time high of 1.4829 Dollars per Euro on November 22, 
2007.  
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Figure 3: The price of one Euro in US Dollars from January 1977 
to December 2006. 
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A more comprehensive figure than figure 2 can be derived according to eurostat, 
“Data are taken from the European system of central banks (Eurosystem). The 
source is the European Central Bank. Until 31 December 1998 these exchange 
rates refer to the ECU and the source was the European Commission. The ECU 
rates are as calculated by the European Commission according to the 
Commission Communication of 13 March 1979 on “the calculation of the 
equivalent of the ECU and the European Unit of Account published by the 
Commission””.52  
 
To show the exchange rate movement in a larger context, I chose to include this 
graph for a longer period. In the last 30 years, there were several ups and downs in 
                                                 
51 Data source: eurostat; see eurostat Homepage for full data set (http:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat). 
52 Citation from: “http://europa.eu.int/estatref/info/sdds/en/ert/ert_bil_eur_sm.htm#basic_data” 
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the relationship of Dollar and Euro. The constant decline of the Euro in the late 
1990’s might be explainable through the US stock market boom of that time and 
the appreciation of the Dollar because of the large amount of direct investments in 
the US markets. 
 
The high number of 1.44072 of the Euro value in July 1980 was the highest for 
almost three decades. Only in November 2007, this value has been exceeded and 
the new top figure is now the one of November 22, 2007 with a value of 1.4829 
Dollars per Euro. 
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Figure 4: Euro movement from January 1997 to December 2006 
based on Indices. 
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Figure 4 shows the development of the Euro compared to the US Dollar based on 
indices, where either i95 or i96 equals 100%. One can see that the curves are the 
inversion of the movement in Table 2. That means that in July 2001 the Dollar 
was at around 150% of its worth of 1995/1996 relative to the Euro. This Figure 
does not provide as much explanatory power as I hoped it would but it represents 
a not so often used view on exchange rate development. 
                                                 
53 Data source: eurostat; see eurostat Homepage for full data set (http:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat). 
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5.1. The weak start of the Euro 
 
The Euro has permanently and continuously depreciated versus the US Dollar in 
the time span in which the Euro was only a virtual currency. As data show, the 
market value in comparison to the Dollar began to rise again shortly after the 
emission of Euro cash.54 In the literature I found some attempted explanations of 
this matter. 
 
The first year of the Euro is subject to a paper by Svensson (2000). He 
investigated the success of the Euro system in its first year by taking a closer look 
at the (achieved or not) goals, the monetary policy decisions and their framework 
and the communication with third parties. The ECB’s focus is on the medium run, 
this being an argument in favor of a not precipitate interest rate adjustment. The 
impression of a flexible inflation targeting monetary policy is supported. 
Svensson spots no “fatal mistakes in either design or instrument setting”55 and he 
concludes by expressing his optimism about the future of Euro system monetary 
policy. 
 
Even before the introduction of the Euro in terms of hard cash, Cohen and Loisel 
(2001) published an article that dealt with the phenomenon of the weak Euro at 
                                                 
54 From January 1 1999 to December 31 2001, the Euro was only a deposit currency until the 
tangible money was introduced in 2002. For a graphical illustration see Figure 1 of this paper. 
55 Citation from: Svensson, L. "The First Year of the Eurosystem: Inflation Targeting or Not?" The 
American Economic Review Vol. 90 No. 2 (March 2000) pp. 95-99 
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that time. The authors find the main reason for the depreciation in too strict and 
tight fiscal arrangements to fulfill the convergence criteria and the convergence of 
interest rates which meant in most of the member countries a lowering of the 
interest rates. 
 
One big issue was of course the booming US stock market at the end of the 1990’s 
which resulted in huge capital flows into the US. The most interesting aspect 
concerning stock markets is, however, that the Euro fell even when the European 
stock market performed better than the stock market in the US.  
 
Cohen and Loisel (2001) published a finding that refers to the former mentioned 
reasons and the fact that inflation in Europe has always been significantly lower 
than in the US. Based on these figures they draw the meaningful conclusion that 
the main reason for the struggling Euro in its early years was excess supply. A 
tight fiscal policy and loose monetary policy were held responsible for this 
situation by the authors. 
 
The reason for the supply problem in the early years of the Euro might also have 
been that all the sovereign currencies were exchanged at full value into the new 
currency. The aspect that induced excess supply was that with the new, common 
currency there was no longer the need to keep as many cash reserves as before. 
All European countries had considerable cash reserves in other European 
currencies. But these countries from 2002 on all had the Euro. Because of the no 
more needed reserves for currency exchanges but the still existent physical 
presence of them, it was permissible to talk about excess supply. 
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Another reason for excess supply may be innovations and new means in payment 
arrangements which lead to an economization in the use of currency and drives 
individuals to carry less cash. This phenomenon is examined in an article by 
Green (2002) where he deals with the subject of alternative means of money 
transactions. The paper itself does not relate to EMU, but it treats a global topic 
that is also applicable to Europe. 
 
One of the most interesting points in the article is the empirical proof of the US 
stock market being some sort of a trendsetter for the European one. As data show, 
a positive supply shock in the US market leads to a permanent increase in the 
domestic stock market and a temporary increase in the foreign (here: European) 
stock market, while a positive supply shock in Europe leads to an increase in the 
European stock market, but leaves the US stock market practically untouched. 
The effect of supply shocks on exchange rates was rather surprising: The studies 
of Cohen and Loisel (2001) showed that a positive supply shock in the US market 
appreciates the Dollar, while a positive supply shock in Europe depreciates the 
Euro. 
 
 
5.2. Variables explaining the Euro-Dollar exchange rate  
 
During the process of reviewing the literature on the subject I found few data 
evidently explaining the movement of the exchange rate. Most of the studies 
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conducted concentrate on the impact of interest rates on the exchange rate 
movement. A very recently issued article by Fernando Alvarez, Andrew Atkeson, 
and Patrick J. Kehoe; with the title “If Exchange Rates Are Random Walks, Then 
Almost Everything We Say About Monetary Policy Is Wrong”56 expresses serious 
doubts on the predictability of exchange rates with the help of current prediction 
tools. They write that the main focus of monetary policy analysis right now is to 
determine how changes in an asset price and the short-term interest rates affect the 
economy. The authors explain that “[…] if exchange rates are random walks, 
then all of the fluctuations in interest differentials are accounted for by 
fluctuations in conditional variances and none by fluctuations in conditional 
means. The data are so opposite of what standard models assume that even the 
most die-hard defenders of them should take note. If these data are accurate, then 
almost everything we say about monetary policy is wrong.”57 
 
Engel and West (2005) stated that exchange rate models since the 1970’s had the 
common belief that exchange rate models equal asset prices and therefore are 
influenced by future expectations. One of their findings shows “[…] that the 
presence of persistent deviations from uncovered interest parity, in the form of a 
                                                 
56 See: Alvarez,  F., Atkeson, A. and Kehoe, P. “If Exchange Rates Are Random Walks, Then 
Almost Everything We Say About Monetary Policy Is Wrong” AEA Papers and Proceedings (May 
2007) pp. 339-345 
57 Citation from: Alvarez, F., Atkeson, A. and Kehoe, P. “If Exchange Rates Are Random Walks, 
Then Almost Everything We Say About Monetary Policy Is Wrong” AEA Papers and Proceedings 
(May 2007) pp. 339-345. See Article for further details on the matter and remarks on the observed 
data. 
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risk premium or expectational error, could potentially play a large role in 
accounting for movements in exchange rates.”58 
 
5.2.1. Model 1: Trade Balance of the Euro Area and the 
Euro/Dollar Exchange rate 
 
In an empirical attempt to show which data are explaining the exchange rate of the 
Euro to the Dollar I tried to find a linkage of the exchange rate and the trade 
balance of the Euro area. In figures 5 and 6 I present an illustration of both the 
trade balance and the exchange rate movement for the data viewed. I chose the 
time span from 1999 (the launch of the Euro) to 2006 based on monthly data 
where the data for 1999 represent the 11 Euro Zone countries (Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and 
Finland) and from 2000 on, the data represent the 12 Euro Zone countries (the 11 
original ones including Greece). The numbers of the trade balance do not 
represent Euro Zone/US market trade, but Euro Zone trade with the rest of the 
world.59 
                                                 
58 Citation from: Engel, C. and West, K. “Exchange Rates and Fundamentals” Journal of Political 
Economy Vol. 113 (2005), pp. 485–517 
59 Data source: eurostat; see eurostat Homepage for full data set (http:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat). 
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Figure 5: Trade Balance of the Euro Area from January 1999 to 
December 2006 
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One can see a constantly negative period from August 1999 to June 2001. From 
there on, the curve makes vast movements, which does not lead to the assumption 
of a continuous development.  
                                                 
60 Data source: eurostat; see eurostat Homepage for full data set (http:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat). The 
direct URL to the trade balance data source is: 
“http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/extraction/evalight/EVAlight.jsp?A=1&language=de&root=/theme1
/euroind/bp/bpca_m” 
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Figure 6: The Euro/Dollar Exchange rate movement from 
January 1999 to December 2006 
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I created a data set of the Euro/US Dollar exchange rate from January 1999 to 
December 2006 based on monthly average data and the trade balance of the Euro 
area countries (11 countries in 1999, 12 countries from 2000). I ran a linear 
regression with the exchange rate being the independent variable and the trade 
balance as the independent one.  
                                                 
61 Data source: eurostat; see eurostat Homepage for full data set (http:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat). The 
direct URL to the exchange rate data source is: 
“http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/extraction/evalight/EVAlight.jsp?A=1&language=de&root=/theme2
/ert/ert_bil_eur_m” 
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Table 1: Significance 
 
ANOVAb
,199 1 ,199 9,624 ,003a
1,942 94 ,021
2,141 95
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Trade Balance Euro Areaa. 
Dependent Variable: Exchange Rate USD / EURb. 
 
 
 
The first finding shows, that the model is significant at the 0.003 level, i.e. highly 
significant. 
 
 
Table 2: r² and standard error 
 
Model Summaryb
,305a ,093 ,083 ,14373178
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Trade Balance Euro Areaa. 
Dependent Variable: Exchange Rate USD / EURb. 
 
 
 
The r² of the model shows, that only 9.3 % of the data is explained by the model 
with a standard error of 0.1437. 
 
  Page 58 
Thoughts about the EURO – predictions, reflections and analysis within a decade 
The outcome of the regression shows an interesting tendency. The exchange rate 
of the Euro to the Dollar seems to rate the Euro higher at times when the trade 
balance of the Euro Zone is higher. According to traditional findings, the higher 
the value of the domestic currency, the worse it should be for exports, as domestic 
goods become more expensive abroad. 
 
 
Figure 7: Relations between Exchange rate and Trade Balance 
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Figure 5 shows that the tendency as indicated by the black line leads to the 
conclusion, that the better the European trade balance performs, the more valuable 
the Euro is compared to the Dollar. The model however only explains around 9,3 
% of the variance of the data which means that this conclusion has no very high 
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value as shown in Figure 5 with the single points of intersection being not very 
close to the median line. Estimation of the standard error shows that significance 
is not achieved. 
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5.2.2. Model 2: Refinancing Interest Rates of the ECB and the 
Fed and the Euro/Dollar Exchange rate 
 
In the second model I ran a linear regression with data of the refinancing interest 
rates of the ECB and the Fed (see Figure 1) and looked at the links to the 
development of the Euro/Dollar exchange rate (see Figure 6) all in the time span 
of January 1999 to December 2006. All data are based on monthly averages. I 
selected the exchange rate as the independent variable and the two interest rates as 
the dependent variables.62 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics  
 
Descriptive Statistics
1,0882625 ,15011407 96
3,9245 ,89378 96
3,4349 1,89120 96
Exchange Rate
USD / EUR
Refinancing
Interest ECB (EU)
Refinancing
Interest Fed (US)
Mean Std. Deviation N
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Again, the data are taken from the eurostat Homepage (http:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat) 
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The numbers of Table 3 show, that the mean of the exchange rate over the 
examined period is close to one which of course leaves the serious ups and downs 
as expressed by the standard deviation over time unnoted. The Mean of the 
refinancing interest rates of both the ECB and the Fed also lie within 0.5 percent 
with approx. 3.92% on the European side and approx. 3.43% on the US side. The 
standard deviations of the interest rates show larger activities on the Fed’s 
movements.  
 
 
Table 4: Correlations of model 2 
 
Correlations
1,000 -,780 -,226
-,780 1,000 ,547
-,226 ,547 1,000
. ,000 ,013
,000 . ,000
,013 ,000 .
96 96 96
96 96 96
96 96 96
Exchange Rate
USD / EUR
Refinancing
Interest ECB (EU)
Refinancing
Interest Fed (US)
Exchange Rate
USD / EUR
Refinancing
Interest ECB (EU)
Refinancing
Interest Fed (US)
Exchange Rate
USD / EUR
Refinancing
Interest ECB (EU)
Refinancing
Interest Fed (US)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Exchange
Rate USD /
EUR
Refinancing
Interest ECB
(EU)
Refinancing
Interest Fed
(US)
 
 
 
Table 4 shows the highly negative correlation of the ECB refinancing interest rate 
and the lightly negative correlation of the Fed refinancing interest rate to the 
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Euro/Dollar exchange rate. The high significance levels for the two investigated 
indices in the observed 96 cases leads to the assumption that the model is 
reasonable. The linkages between refinancing interest rates and exchange rate 
values is graphically shown in the two scatter plots that are indicated as figures 
eight and nine. 
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Figure 8: Scatter plot of Dollar/Euro Exchange Rate and ECB 
refinancing interest rate 
 
0,90000 1,00000 1,10000 1,20000 1,30000
Exchange Rate USD / EUR
3,00
4,00
5,00
R
ef
in
an
ci
ng
 E
C
B
 (E
U
)
AAA
AAAA
AA
A
A
AA
AAA
A
A A AAAA
AA
A
AAAA A A AA A
A AA
A A
AAAA A A AAAA A A AAAAAAA
A AA
A A A
A
AA
A A
A
 
 
 
Figure eight shows the negative correlation between the refinancing interest rate 
of the ECB and the Euro/Dollar exchange rate. The scatter plot indicates low 
values of the Euro when the interest rate is high and an accumulation of higher 
values of the Euro that are linked to lower interest rates. 
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One can see that there are a few outliers, but the big picture shows clearly that 
higher interest rates are commonly associated with lower exchange rates 
compared to the US Dollar. 
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Figure 9: Scatter plot of Dollar/Euro Exchange Rate and Fed 
refinancing interest rate 
 
0,90000 1,00000 1,10000 1,20000 1,30000
Exchange Rate USD / EUR
1,00
1,25
1,50
1,75
2,00
2,25
2,50
2,75
3,00
3,25
3,50
3,75
4,00
4,25
4,50
4,75
5,00
5,25
5,50
5,75
6,00
6,50
R
ef
in
an
ci
ng
 In
te
re
st
 F
ed
 (U
S) AA
AAAA A AAA
A
A
AAAAAA
A
AA A
AA
A
AA
A AAAA A
AA
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
A
AAAA A A AA
AA AAA A
AAAA A A AA
AA
A
A A
A
AA
A
AA
A
AA
A
AA
A
A
AA
A A
A
AAAA A
 
 
 
The scatter plot in figure nine does not allow the making of a clear statement. 
There are high and low exchange rate values in both cases of low and high 
refinancing interest rates in the US. The analysis of figures 8 and 9 leads to the 
conclusion that European interest rates do have a rather predictable influence on 
the Euro/Dollar exchange rate, while data concerning the influence of US interest 
rates on the Euro/Dollar exchange rate is distributed rather randomly. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The summary of the vast amount of literature on the Euro subject was really 
challenging. I tried to provide the most important information and most crucial 
findings that were published within the investigated time span. The literature 
supported the a priori assumption that US publications were rather negative about 
the Euro, especially at the time before 2002, partly because the US economy tried 
to weaken the hype that was going on around the European common currency 
which had become a real competition for the Dollar in the battle for the leading 
global currency. 
 
European publications on the other hand tried mostly to reduce the uncertainty 
about the development of the Euro and shed a rather positive light on future 
expectations. 
 
I treated the ECB, its system and monetary policy as well as its fiscal targets. I 
tried to provide some useful information about the European monetary system and 
its role in global context. The leading role of the US Federal reserve was 
highlighted and the role of the ECB as a follower of the trends in interest rate 
movements with more moderate measures and after a considerable time lag to 
avoid hasty decisions. 
 
The last chapter is all about the relationship between the Euro and the US Dollar. 
The comments on the literature were very versatile. Especially the issue of 
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exchange rates came to the center of attention in the last couple of years. I tried to 
mention some of the most common ways to deal with the subject as well as some 
of the more extravagant ways of looking at exchange rates. It is mostly up to the 
individual reader to decide on a favorite way of measuring and predicting 
exchange rate movements, as the voices that call the developments as being close 
to a random walk become louder and louder. 
 
In the final section, I provide two small models that link trade volume and interest 
rates to the exchange rate movement of the Euro compared to the dollar. Both 
models turned out to be significant and indicated trends, but the findings are 
certainly not the peak of wisdom. 
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8. Appendix 
 
8.1. Abstract in English 
 
This diploma thesis is meant to provide an overview of the literature on the 
common European currency, the Euro in the time span from 1997 to 2006. The 
choice for this decade came because of the fact that the events of fixing the 
Stability and Growth Pact of the European Union as well as the implementation of 
the Maastricht criteria, the introduction of the Euro as a virtual currency in 1999 
and Euro cash in 2002 all took place in the observed years. Thus the years just 
before the start, the start itself and the first years with the new currency were 
examined in this paper. 
 
While chapters one and two are and abstract and the introduction, chapter three 
and its subchapters are strictly dedicated to the issue of reviewing the literature 
and try to give an understanding of both the European and the American view on 
the Euro. 
 
Chapter four broadly deals with the political issues that come along with the 
change in the European economic area. The decisions of policymakers are of 
tremendous importance when taking such a big step. These steps come alongside 
the economical ones when creating a monetary union. The trade off between the 
benefits of a common trade area and the loss of the powerful instrument of the 
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sovereign national monetary policy and the symbolic value of a common currency 
that were supposed to stimulate the citizens of the EU to develop a more 
sophisticated sense of community were the most challenging issues that policy 
makers of EMU countries had to deal with. 
 
The European Central Bank, its structures and goals in monetary policy are dealt 
with in this paper as well as the possibilities of the ECB to achieve its goals and 
the troubled first years of EMU. The leading role of the US Federal and the role of 
the ECB as a follower of the trends in interest rate movements are also highlighted 
and supported by numerous articles. 
 
Another big issue, especially in the most recent past, is the phenomenon of 
exchange rate movements. This paper provides information on the different views 
of looking at exchange rates and focuses mainly on the Euro/Dollar relationship. I 
treat the most common ways of measuring and predicting exchange rate 
movements and present two simple models that fit in the big picture – they are 
significant and, in part, indicate a certain trend but one can not really draw 
meaningful conclusions in terms of predicting future movements from them. The 
literature of the articles that concentrate on exchange rate movements leads to the 
conclusion that the theory of exchange rate movements being close to random 
walks cannot be rejected. 
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8.2. Abstract in German / Zusammenfassung in deutscher 
Sprache 
 
Das Ziel dieser Diplomarbeit ist es, dem Leser einen Überblick über die 
einschlägige Literatur der letzten zehn Jahre, welche sich mit der europäischen 
Einheitswährung, dem Euro, beschäftigt, zu verschaffen. Der Zeitraum von 1997 
bis 2006 schien mir angemessen, da sowohl die Einigung auf den Wachstums- 
und Stabilitätspakt als auch die Festlegung der Maastricht Kriterien und die 
Einführung des Euro als Buchgeld 1999 und als Bargeld 2002 in diese Zeitspanne 
fällt. Des Weiteren ermöglicht dieser Zeitraum die Beobachtung der Jahre kurz 
vor der Einführung des Euro, die Zeit der Einführung selbst und die Beobachtung 
der ersten Jahre mit der neuen Währung. 
 
Nachdem die Kapitel eins und zwei einen Abstract und die Einführung in die 
Arbeit beinhalten, werden in Kapitel drei und seinen Unterkapiteln Artikel aus der 
Fachliteratur bearbeitet und es wird versucht, dem Leser einen Eindruck der 
Sichtweisen den Euro betreffend von beiden Seiten des Atlantischen Ozeans aus 
zu vermitteln. 
 
Politische Themen die mit einer derart weitgreifenden Änderung im Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsraum wie der Einführung einer gemeinsamen Währung einhergehen 
werden im Kapitel vier untersucht. Die politischen Aspekte und ihre Verknüpfung 
und Auswirkung auf Ökonomische Bereiche werden ebenso besprochen wie die 
Notwendigkeit von politischen Entscheidungsträgern wirtschaftliche Vorteile wie 
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die Freihandelszone ohne Wechselkursrisken gegen politische Nachteile wie die 
Aufgabe der souveränen Wechselkurspolitik an eine übergeordnete Stelle 
abzuwägen. Die Stärkung des Gemeinschaftssinnes durch eine einheitliche 
Währung ist außerdem als positiver Effekt anzumerken. 
 
Die Europäische Zentralbank, ihre Strukturen und geldpolitische Ziele werden 
ebenfalls in der Arbeit betrachtet. Auch werden die schwierigen ersten Jahre der 
Währungsunion und die Beziehungen der europäischen Zentralbank zur ihrem 
amerikanischen Pendant, der Federal Reserve, genauer unter die Lupe genommen. 
 
Den Abschluss der Arbeit bilden Gedanken und Reflektionen über die 
Erscheinung der Wechselkursentwicklungen. Es werden verschiedenste Ansätze 
in der Theorie besprochen, und zwei simple Beispiele der Beziehung des 
Euro/Dollar Wechselkurses in Relation zu Leistungsbilanzen bzw. zu 
Refinanzierungszinssätzen runden das Kapitel ab. Auf Grund des momentanen 
Informationsstandes besagt der allgemeine Grundtenor zurzeit, dass die Annahme, 
dass Wechselkursentwicklungen weithingehend einem Zufallsprinzip folgen nicht 
völlig ausgeschlossen werden kann. 
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